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Abstract
If we accept the view that language ﬁrst evolved from the conceptual struc-
ture of our pre-linguistic ancestors, several questions arise, including: What
kind of structure? Concepts about what? Here we review research on the vocal
communication and cognition of nonhuman primates, focusing on results that
may be relevant to the earliest stages of language evolution. From these data
we conclude, ﬁrst, that nonhuman primates’ inability to represent the mental
states of others makes their communication fundamentally different from hu-
man language. Second, while nonhuman primates’ production of vocalizations
is highly constrained, their ability to extract complex information from sounds
is not. Upon hearing vocalizations, listeners acquire information about their
social companions that is referential, discretely coded, hierarchically struc-
tured, rule-governed, and propositional. We therefore suggest that, in the ear-
liest stages of language evolution, communication had a formal structure that
grew out of its speakers’ knowledge of social relations.136 Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth
That which distinguishes man from the lower ani-
mals is not the understanding of articulate sounds,
for, as every one knows, dogs understand many
words and sentences ... It is not the mere articula-
tionwhichisourdistinguishingcharacter, forparrots
and other birds possess this power. Nor is it the mere
capacity of connecting deﬁnite sounds with deﬁnite
ideas; for it is certain that some parrots, which have
been taught to speak, connect unerringly words with
things, and persons with events. The lower animals
differ from man solely in his almost inﬁnitely larger
power of associating together the most diversiﬁed
sounds and ideas; and this obviously depends on
the high development of his mental powers. (Charles
Darwin, 1871, The Descent of Man)
1. Introduction
Since at least the time of Locke (1690), a central tenet of the philosophy of lan-
guage has held that language derives from our experience with objects, events,
and the relations we perceive in the world. This assumption underlies many
studies of children’s language learning, where it is generally accepted that “a
well-articulated conceptual structure predates language and is (one of) its re-
quired causal engines” (Fisher and Gleitman 2003). It also appears in theories
of language evolution, where several authors have suggested that “the roots
of grammar lie in prehuman conceptual structure” (Newmeyer 2003; see also
Pinker and Bloom 1990; Jackendoff 1987, 2002; Kirby 1998; Newmeyer 1991;
Hurford 1998, 2003).
This hypothesis, however, begs several questions: What kind of structure?
Concepts about what? To explain the earliest stages of language evolution, one
would ideally like to describe communication and cognition in the common
ancestor of human and nonhuman primates and then identify the ﬁrst signiﬁ-
cant changes that might logically have led, over the next several million years,
to modern human language.
Few discussions of language evolution, however, start with this common
ancestor. Indeed, most speculations about the evolution of language make only
passing reference to the natural communication and cognition of non-linguistic
primates, choosing instead to emphasize the most complex properties of mod-
ern languages (Pinker and Bloom 1990; Pinker 1994; Deacon 1997; Jackendoff
1987, 2002).
Others have searched for the origins of language in the tools and cave paint-
ings left by early members of the genus Homo (e.g., Mithen 1996), through
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by drawing analogies between proto-language and the simple pidgins used by
some modernhumans (Bickerton 1990; Calvinand Bickerton2000). Either im-
plicitly or explicitly, however, all such attempts have concerned a hypothetical
creature that already had the capacity to represent abstract thoughts symboli-
cally (in the case of artifacts), to imitate sounds and generate new words (in
the case of many models), or to use a simple grammar (in the case of pid-
gins). In other words, they have concerned a species that likely had long since
diverged from the common ape/human ancestor and already had many of the
cognitive and communicative abilities that we regard as uniquely human. Con-
versely, attempts to infer language abilities by reconstructing the anatomy of
early human vocal tracts (e.g., Lieberman 1984, 1991) have not considered the
cognitive abilities that would have made a human vocal tract adaptive.
Given the extraordinary complexity of language and the daunting problems
it poses for language learners, it is easy to see why so many linguists have
concluded that to explain language evolution one must explain the evolution
of syntax and semantics in all of their complexity. This is not, however, where
an account of language evolution ought to begin. Fully human syntax arguably
emerged relatively late in evolution, after a period of time when other, simpler
features of language and cognition had already appeared. These simpler fea-
tures would have been adaptive in their own right and, more importantly, would
have constituted a new system of communication that, unlike its predecessors,
created the preconditions needed to favor the evolution of more complex fea-
tures like syntax.
What were these simpler features? In the sections below we review some
recent research on the vocal communication and cognition of nonhuman pri-
mates, focusing in particular on results that may be relevant to the earliest
stages of language evolution. From these data we draw several conclusions.
First, nonhuman primates’ inability to represent the mental states of others
makes their communication fundamentally different from human language.
Second, while nonhuman primates’ production of vocalizations is highly con-
strained, their ability to extract complex information from sounds is not. Upon
hearing vocalizations, listeners acquire information that is referential, highly
structured, propositional, andrule-governed.Third, atleastsome ofthe compo-
nents of prehuman cognitive structure that may have given rise to the evolution
of language are evident in primates’ knowledge of social relationships.
2. Theory of mind and the use of vocalizations by non-human primates
Baboons (genus Papio) are Old World monkeys that shared a common ancestor
with humans approximately 36 million years ago (Boyd and Silk 2000). They
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though most males emigrate to other groups as young adults, females remain
in their natal groups throughout their lives, maintaining close social bonds with
their matrilineal kin. Females can be ranked in stable, linear dominance hierar-
chies that deﬁne priority of access to scarce resources. Offspring acquire ranks
similar to those of their mothers. The stable core of a baboon group, therefore,
is a hierarchy of matrilines (for reviews see Melnick and Pearl 1987; Silk et al.
1999).
When moving through wooded areas of their range, baboons often give
loud contact barks (Cheney et al. 1996; Rendall et al. 2000; Fischer et al.
2000). Because barks from widely separated individuals are typically tempo-
rally clumped, baboons often appear to be answering one another. It is unclear,
however, whether individuals give barks with the intent of informing others of
theirlocation,orwhetherthesecallssimplyreﬂectasignaler’sownstateofsep-
aration from the group. These two explanations are functionally equivalent, be-
cause in either case listeners could use contact barks to determine the location
of other group members. However, they are based on very different underlying
mental mechanisms. The ﬁrst explanation assumes that callers recognize that
other individuals may be ignorant of the group’s location even when they are
not. It assumes that baboons have a ‘theory of mind’ (Premack and Woodruff
1978). The second makes no such assumptions. It requires only that callers vo-
calize when they are anxious, and that listeners learn that contact barks inform
them of the location of at least one other individual.
The distinction between these two explanations is crucially important to the-
ories of language evolution. If, as Grice (1957) and others have argued, true
linguistic communication cannot occur unless both speaker and listener take
into account each other’s state of mind, then monkeys cannot be said to com-
municate unless they use calls like contact barks with the intent to provide
information to others. By contrast, if monkeys cannot recognize the distinction
between their own knowledge and somebody else’s, calls that serve an infor-
mative function will be based on mental mechanisms that differ fundamentally
from those found in human speech. Hypotheses based on mental state attribu-
tion predict that individuals will answer the contact barks of others even when
they themselves are in the center of the group progression and at no risk of
becoming lost. Alternatively, if baboons are incapable of understanding that
other individuals’ mental states can be different from their own, they should be
unable to recognize when another individual thinks that she has become lost
unless they themselves face a similar risk. Under these circumstances, contact
barks will simply reﬂect the state and location of the signaler.
Playback experiments support the latter interpretation. When females were
played a relative’s contact bark from a distant loudspeaker, they gave an ‘an-
swering’ bark only when they themselves were separated from the group
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infants(Rendalletal.2000).(Byanalogy,imaginetheresponseofahumanpar-
ent in a busy store who hears her child crying that she is lost.) Calling appears
to be an emotional reaction to a stressful and potentially dangerous situation.
Although most contact barks elicit no answering calls, giving a bark potentially
beneﬁts the signaler because it prompts listeners to assess their own positions
(however reﬂexively) and perhaps give a bark themselves, thereby alerting the
signaler to the location of at least one individual. Because barks (like many pri-
mate calls) are individually distinctive (reviewed by Snowdon 1990, Ghaz and
Santos 2004), and because there is a close link between the eliciting stimulus
and the production of a speciﬁc type of call, listeners recognize immediately
both the signaler’s identity and her location. Listeners thus acquire information
from a signaler who did not, in the human sense, intend to provide it.
The lack of a theory of mind constitutes a fundamental difference between
human language and nonhuman primate communication. In humans, percep-
tion of another individual’s mental state is perhaps the most common stimulus
eliciting speech: we talk to inform, persuade, or in some way change what an-
other thinks. By contrast, while monkeys may recognize the effect that their
vocalizations have on their audience’s behavior, they seem largely unaware of
their effect on their audience’s knowledge and beliefs (Cheney and Seyfarth
1990, 1997b; Seyfarth and Cheney 2003b).
Monkeys clearly lack language, so it is not surprising that they lack a full-
blown theory of mind. This is not to say, however, that organisms lacking lan-
guage are entirely incapable of inferring intent and motives in others. In chil-
dren, inferences about other individuals’ attention, motives, and directedness
constitute an early precursor to language learning and full mental state attribu-
tion (see, e.g., Malle et al. 2001). Long before they are able to attribute false
beliefs to others, children can recognize the focus of another individual’s in-
tentions and other individuals’ likes and dislikes (see below).
Similarly, despite their apparent inability to distinguish other animals’ men-
tal states from their own (e.g., Povinelli and Eddy 1996; reviewed in Tomasello
and Call 1997), chimpanzees appear to have a rudimentary understanding of
the relation between seeing and knowing. Experiments conducted by Hare et
al. (2000, 2001) suggest that, in at least some situations, chimpanzees know
what a conspeciﬁc has or has not seen, and from this information may infer
what a conspeciﬁc does or does not know. In contrast, monkeys seem unable
to recognize the referential nature of attention. In the absence of training, for
example, they are unable to use pointing or gaze direction to locate hidden
objects (Anderson et al. 1996; Tomasello and Call 1997; Vick et al. 2001).
Nonetheless, monkeys are very attentive to other individuals’ gaze, particu-
larly when it is directed at themselves (Perrett and Emery, 1994; Emery, 2000).
They use gaze to target opponents and to recruit other individuals’ support in
aggressive alliances (Sato and Nakamura 2001; Tomasello et al. 2001). At a140 Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth
rudimentary level, then, monkeys may use the information obtained from an-
other individual’s direction of gaze to make inferences about her intentions –
to infer, for example, that a threat gesture is directed at themselves and not at
someone else.
Socialinteractions among baboons are mediatednot onlyby different behav-
iors associatedwith afﬁliation and aggression, but also by a variety of vocaliza-
tions.Their mostcommonvocalizationisa lowamplitude grunt, whichappears
to signal benign intent and facilitates social interaction (Cheney et al. 1995b;
Silk et al. 1996). Because baboons live in large social groups, however, the in-
tended recipient of a grunt is not always immediately apparent. For example,
in a typical social interaction a dominant female approaches two subordinate
females, one of whom has an infant, and utters a grunt. The female with the
infant remains seated, while the other moves away. How does a female decide
whethertostayorleave?Toalargedegree,herresponsemaydependupongaze
direction and relatively simple learned contingencies. Vocalizing females often
appear to be looking at one particular individual, and recipients are doubtless
sensitive to gaze direction. Similarly, both the mother and the female without
an infant may have learned that grunts are correlated with the handling of an
infant. As a result, the female without an infant moves away while the mother
remains seated (Cheney et al. 1995b; Silk 2002).
When accompanyingvisual signals are absent, however, the interpretation of
vocal signals may be more difﬁcult. Baboons often forage in woodland where
other individuals can be heard but not seen. Vocal signals like grunts are indi-
vidually distinctive (Owren et al. 1997; Rendall et al. 1999), so listeners can
readily ascertain an unseen caller’s identity. In the absence of visual cues, how-
ever, listeners may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to determine the caller’s intended recipient,
and hence the appropriate behavioral response. Again, relatively simple con-
tingencies, including the nature of recent interactions, may guide listeners’ re-
sponses.
For example, after 13% of aggressive disputes among adult female baboons,
dominant females grunt to their former victims. These grunts appear to serve a
reconciliatory function, both reducing the anxiety of subordinate females (Ch-
eney et al. 1995) and inﬂuencing their subsequent interactions. Cheney and
Seyfarth (1997a) used a playback experiment to mimic vocal reconciliation.
Subordinate subjects were played the grunt of their former opponent in the
minutes immediately following a dispute and then observed for half an hour.
As controls, subjects heard either no grunt at all or the grunt of another domi-
nant female who had not been involved in the earlier dispute. After playbacks
of reconciliatory grunts, subjects approached their former opponents and toler-
ated their opponents’ approaches at signiﬁcantly higher rates than they did in
the absence of a grunt. In contrast, when subjects heard either a control grunt
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niﬁcantly, subjects’ interactions with control females were unaffected by call
playbacks. Simply hearing a more dominant female’s grunt did not increase the
likelihood that subjects would approach that female.
These results are relevant to hypotheses concerned with monkeys’ ability to
judge the directedness of vocal signals. By approaching an opponent only if
they had recently heard her reconciliatory grunt, subjects behaved as if they
interpreted the grunt as a signal of the opponent’s friendly intent toward them.
In contrast, by failing to respond to the grunt of an uninvolved female, they
acted as if they interpreted that call as directed at someone else.
Subordinate subjects’ responses were not simply the result of priming due
to a recent interaction. In subsequent experiments, Engh et al. (in press) played
a dominant female’s threat-grunts to a subordinate subject shortly after that
female had either groomed or fought with the subject. Subjects responded sig-
niﬁcantly more strongly to the threat-grunt after recent aggression. Moreover,
when the threat-grunt playback had been preceded by aggression rather than
grooming, subjects were signiﬁcantly less likely to approach the dominant sig-
naler within the next 15 minutes and less likely to tolerate the dominant sig-
naler’s approach.
Taken together, these experiments suggest that female baboons are able to
make inferences about the directedness of vocalizations even in the absence of
visual cues, and that the nature of prior interactions affects their subsequent
behavior. Upon hearing a vocalization, listeners need to predict what behavior
is likely to follow. In doing so, they must take into account the identity of the
signaler, call type (is it associated with aggression?), the nature of their prior
interactions with the signaler (were they aggressive, friendly, or neutral?), and
the correlation between past interactions and future ones (does a recent groom-
ing interaction lower or increase the likelihood of aggression?). No doubt con-
tingency learning plays a major role in each of these assessments. However,
because listeners’ responses depend on simultaneous consideration of all of
these factors, however, this learning is likely to be both complex and subtle.
Moreover, explanations based on behavioral contingencies cannot explain
some aspects of listeners’ behavior, in particular their ability to predict whether
a call is directed at themselves or at some other individual. For example, in the
earlier reconciliation experiments (Cheney and Seyfarth 1997a), subjects who
heard their opponent’s reconciliatory grunt following a ﬁght were even more
likely to approach their opponent than they were under baseline conditions. If
listeners’ responses were guided only by learned contingencies, they should
have associated the reconciliatory grunt simply with a low probability of ag-
gression. It should have returned their behavior to baseline tolerance levels, but
it should not have induced them to increase their interactions with the signaler.
It is difﬁcult to explain subjects’ behavior except by arguing that females in-
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of benign intent. We may speculate that monkeys have a rudimentary recog-
nition of other individuals’ intentions toward themselves. If true, this would
represent a crucial ﬁrst step toward a communication system like language, in
which speakers and listeners routinely take into account each other’s motives
and knowledge.
3. The asymmetry between vocal production and comprehension
As manyhavepointed out, physiological constraints place anupper limit on the
varietyofcallsthatnon-humanprimates(andothermammals)canproduce.We
will not belabor this point here, except to reiterate that such constraints limit
not only the number and variety of sounds produced but also the ability of
non-human primates to modify and invent new sounds (see Fitch and Hauser
1995; Fitch 2004; Fischer et al. 2002 for review). Our primary concerns in this
essay are not the physiological but, rather, the cognitive constraints on vocal
production.
Whilethenumberofdistinctcallsthatanimalsproduceishighlyconstrained,
the number of sounds or signs that a parrot, dolphin, sea lion, or chimpanzee
can learn to associate with a given stimulus or outcome is, if not limitless, cer-
tainly in the tens to hundreds. And while we can quibble about the exact nature
of the underlying mental representation that is evoked when a dog hears walk,
car, supper,o rball, the fact that these calls evoke different responses suggests
strongly that they are assigned functionally distinct ‘meanings’ (Thompson
1995; Cheney and Seyfarth 1997b; Schusterman and Kastak 1998; Kaminski
et al. 2004).
For Darwin, the intuition that animals can effortlessly learn to associate myr-
iad sounds and signals with ‘general ideas or concepts’ (1871: 83) was more
signiﬁcant than differences in ‘mere articulation.’ We would argue the point
slightly differently: physiological constraints on production are not just impor-
tant in their own regard; equally striking is the difference between relatively
constrained production and more open-ended perception. Animals’ limited vo-
cal repertoires are particularly puzzling because they appear to have so many
concepts that could, in principle, be articulated.
3.1. Vocal development and modiﬁcation
In marked contrast to children, who learn both to produce and to comprehend
literally thousands of new words during their ﬁrst three years of life, monkeys
and apes rarely modify their vocal repertoires by adding new sounds. Although
someprimatesmakesubtlemodiﬁcationsintheirvocalizationsasaresultofex-
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1994; Seyfarth and Cheney 1997; Crockford et al. 2004), a baboon in Kenya
produces more or less the same sounds in the same contexts as a baboon in
Botswana. This conclusion follows not only from research on many differ-
ent species but also from experiments in which infant macaques were cross-
fostered and raised in groups of another species (Owren et al. 1993). Subjects
in these experiments showed virtually no modiﬁcation in their use of vocaliza-
tions, even in social contexts where the members of their adopted species used
calls that differed from their own.
Thisisnottosaythatprimatevocalizationsarejustinvoluntaryandreﬂexive.
In the laboratory, some features of call production by rhesus macaques can be
brought under operant control (Peirce 1985). In the wild, monkeys vary their
vocal production depending upon context and the identity of social partners
(e.g., Cheney and Seyfarth 1997a). The acoustically different alarm calls given
by primates to different predators, though delivered in emotionally charged
situations, are also not as involuntary as they ﬁrst appear. In the seconds after
spotting a predator, a monkey must decide whether to remain silent or give an
alarm call, and, if an alarm is to be given, which call is appropriate (Seyfarth et
al. 1980; Zuberbuhler et al. 1999; Fischer et al. 2001a, 2001b). The production
of alarm calls by monkeys, like call production in many animals, is affected by
an audience; vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops), for example, seldom
alarm-call when they are alone and are more likely to give alarm calls in the
presence of kin than non-kin (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990; see also Gyger et al.
1986 for data on chickens).
3.2. Repertoire size and vocal production
Although the vocal repertoires of monkeys and apes are undoubtedly smaller
than the vocabularies of humans, it would be wrong to conclude that they con-
sist simply of the limited number of grunts, screams, and barks that are acous-
tically salient to human listeners. In fact, most nonhuman primates possess an
acoustically graded vocal repertoire. Despite this intergradation, acoustically
different callsare often associatedwith qualitativelydifferentcontexts and,like
humans, primates appear to perceive categorical boundaries within this acous-
tic continuum. They do so in two respects. First, they distinguish the calls of
other group members despite the apparent lack of discrete acoustical bound-
aries between different individuals’ voices (e.g., Snowdon 1987; Mitani 1996;
Rendall et al. 1996; Cheney and Seyfarth 1997b; Rendall et al. 1999). Sec-
ond, listeners recognize distinct subtypes within broad acoustic classes, each
of which conveys different information. Baboons, for example, respond dif-
ferently to social and move grunts (Rendall et al. 1999), to contact and alarm
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et al. 2003). Their different responses suggest that they assign functionally
referential ‘meaning’ to these acoustically graded sounds (Marler et al. 1992;
Hauser 1996; Rendall 2003).
The perception of call subtypes within a graded acoustic continuum in-
creases effective repertoire size. So does call combination. Indeed, two re-
cent studies suggest that monkeys and apes may effectively increase their vocal
repertoire by combining existing calls and assigning these combinations to new
contexts.
Like many forest monkeys, Campbell’s monkeys (Cercopithecus campbelli)
give acoustically different alarm calls to leopards and eagles. In less dangerous
contexts, they emit a low, resounding ‘boom’ call prior to the alarm calls. Sym-
patric diana monkeys (C. diana) respond strongly to the Campbell’s monkey
alarm calls. They also appear to be sensitive to the semantic changes caused
by call combination, because they no longer respond to Campbell’s monkeys
alarm calls if they are preceded by a boom (Zuberbuhler 2002; see also Robin-
son 1984; Snowdon 1990). Similarly, chimpanzees frequently combine differ-
ent call types when vocalizing, and in some cases also supplement calls by
drumming their hands and feet against resonant tree buttresses (Mitani 1993).
In the Ivory Coast, male chimpanzees produce three acoustically different sub-
types of barks: one when hunting, one when they encounter snakes, and a third,
more generic bark type in a variety of different contexts. In two very limited
circumstances, when traveling or encountering a neighboring group, the chim-
panzees combine a bark with drumming (Crockford and Boesch 2003). This
signal combination has the potential to convey information that is qualitatively
different from (and more speciﬁc than) the information conveyed by a single
call type.
Depending upon the deﬁnition one chooses, these call combinations may
qualify as syntactical. Marler (1977), for example, distinguished between
phonological syntax, in which call combinations carry a meaning that is more
than just the sum of their parts, and lexical syntax, in which the component
parts alsoplay functional roles as subjects,verbs,modiﬁers, andsoon. Accord-
ing to this distinction, the call combinations discussed above may be examples
of phonological, but perhaps not lexical, syntax (but see Zuberbuhler 2002 for
a slightly different view).
3.3. The mechanisms underlying vocal production
What mental representations, if any, underlie vocal production? When a female
baboon gives a contact bark, does she carry some concept of separation that is
different from the representation that is instantiated when she gives a similar-
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speciﬁc context seems to support the hypothesis that each call is an expres-
sion of a speciﬁc mental concept. Alternatively, the fact that female baboons
throughout Africa give harsh, noisy barks when encountering predators and
tonal barks when separated from the group suggests that links between sound
and concept are far more constrained in baboons than in human languages.
Why might acoustically similar calls serve such markedly different func-
tions? When baboons hear an alarm bark they ﬂee into trees; when they are
separated from the group and hear an acoustically similar contact bark, they
descend from trees and run to join their companions. Given these very different
responses, it seems that selection should have favored contact and alarm calls
that sound unambiguously different, rather than ones that sound alike. Their
acoustic similarity may arise because they are both manifestations of similar
underlying affective states (Owren and Rendall 1997). Predator encounters and
group separation are both potentially dangerous contexts associated with high
states of arousal. The emotions they elicit may be similar enough to lead to
similar-sounding calls.
If this affect-based hypothesis is correct, however, it must also account for
the subtle but consistent acoustic differences between contact and alarm barks
– presumably by suggesting that a caller’s internal states in these two contexts,
while broadly similar, are nonetheless consistently and subtly different. It also
requires that all signalers ‘agree’ about which affective state goes with which
context.Moreover, if calls are manifestations of speciﬁc affectivestates that are
tied to speciﬁc contexts, how do we explain signal combinations such as those
used by chimpanzees when drumming? Snake barks alone are given to snakes;
combined with drumming, they are given to neighboring groups. Without re-
sorting to a convoluted argument that neighbors somehow evoke emotions that
are both snake-related and aggressive (hence the drumming), it is hard to ex-
plain this difference solely by positing a shift in affective state. Just as humans
assign similar-sounding morphemes or morpheme combinations to distinctly
different referents, chimpanzees may have in mind two distinct concepts, one
that is expressed by a bark alone and the other by a bark plus drumming. This,
of course, is simply an hypothesis: the mental mechanisms underlying primate
vocal production remain a largely unexplored puzzle.
3.4. The perception of ‘referential’ vocalizations
Compared with call production, call perception in nonhuman primates exhibits
many more parallels with human speech. Listeners appear to be very sensitive
to the contingencies that surround call production – contingencies that allow
them to derive speciﬁc information about both caller identity and context. In
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‘meaning’ of other novel auditory stimuli (like the jangling of keys) that would
not ordinarily be part of their natural environment. As Darwin noted, animals
seem to have an almost limitless ability to learn new sound-meaning pairings.
While call production shows little modiﬁcation during development, call
perception is readily modiﬁed through experience. In the macaque cross-
fostering experiments mentioned above, call perception was clearly more la-
bile than call production. Whereas cross-fostered individuals showed almost
no change in vocal production, both they and the animals in their adoptive
groups learned to recognize and respond appropriately to each others’ vocal-
izations (Seyfarth and Cheney 1997). Similarly, young vervet monkeys must
learn to distinguish and respond appropriately to the different alarm calls given
by both their own species and nearby ungulates and birds (Seyfarth and Ch-
eney 1990; Hauser 1988). Probably because they cannot recognize ignorance
in others, adults do not actively instruct their offspring in this process. Instead,
infant and juvenile primates learn to distinguish which species are dangerous
and which calls function as alarms through associative processes (Cheney and
Seyfarth 1990; Fischer et al. 2000).
Many primate vocalizations exhibit two properties that allow listeners to ex-
tract speciﬁc information from them. First, some calls have a high “informa-
tive value” (Seyfarth and Cheney 2003b). If a given call type is elicited only
by eagles and eagles rarely appear without eliciting that call, then that call has
potential to provide listeners with reliable information about the presence of an
eagle (Rescorla 1988). When adult vervet and diana monkeys detect an eagle
or hear an eagle’s shriek, they produce an acoustically distinct alarm call; they
do not produce this call when eagles are absent (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990;
Zuberbuhler et al. 1999). Eagle alarm calls are thus highly informative.
Second, some calls with a high informative value also have a high “refer-
ential speciﬁcity” (Seyfarth and Cheney 2003b). For example, diana monkey
eagle alarms are predictive not only about the presence of an eagle but also
about the presence of a speciﬁc species of eagle, because the monkeys give
eagle alarms only to the crowned eagle (Zuberbuhler et al. 1997, 1999). By
contrast, diana monkeys give an alert call to a wide variety of stimuli, includ-
ing mammalian and avian predators, large non-predatory animals, falling trees,
and social disturbances within the group (Zuberbuhler et al. 1997). Alert calls
are vaguely informative (listeners learn that something is happening), but they
have a low referential speciﬁcity.
In habituation-dishabituation experiments, diana monkey females who hear
a male’s leopard alarm call respond by giving leopard alarm calls of their own.
If they then hear a leopard’s growl they show little or no response, apparently
because the growl is now redundant. They do give alarm calls, however, if they
are played the shriek of an eagle (they give eagle alarm calls). Conversely,
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respond to the shriek of an eagle, but do respond with leopard alarms if they
hear the growl of a leopard (Zuberbuhler et al. 1999). Diana monkey leopard
alarms and leopard growls are very different acoustically, as are diana monkey
eaglealarmsandeagleshrieks.Nonetheless,themonkeystreatthetwoleopard-
associated noises and the two eagle-associated noises as if they provide the
same information.
One interpretation of these results argues that the mechanisms underlying
call production and perception include the formation of some mental represen-
tation about the eliciting stimulus, and this information determines whether a
call will be produced and how it will be interpreted (Zuberbuhler et al. 1999).
Such an interpretation suggests parallels between the processing of calls by
monkeys and humans. Just as humans respond to words by noting both their
acoustic properties (auditory processing) and their meaning (semantic process-
ing),monkeysprocesscallsattwolevelsandcan,insomecircumstances,group
acousticallydifferent calls togetherbasedon sharedmeaning(Seyfarth and Ch-
eney 2003b; Zuberbuhler 2003). The meaning of these ‘words’ is deﬁned not
just by the relation between words and objects but by the relation between one
word and another (cf. Deacon 1997; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005).
Our point is not to argue that these vocalizations function exactly like human
words, but to suggest that nonhuman primate vocalizations exhibit just the sort
of rudimentary representational properties that we would expect to ﬁnd in the
communication of a pre-linguistic human ancestor. Natural selection has fa-
vored the evolution of calls that convey highly speciﬁc information and the
evolution of cognitive abilities in listeners that allow them to assess and com-
pare signals according to their meaning. Diana monkeys confront a world in
which there are statistical regularities; from these they learn to place a leop-
ard’s growl and one of their own species’ alarm calls into the same functional
class. Primate calls acquire their referential features at least in part because se-
lection has favored listeners who acquire as much information as possible from
the auditory stimuli that they encounter.
3.5. Vocalizations and social knowledge
The rich information acquired by listeners from relatively impoverished sig-
nals is nowhere more evident than in monkeys’ responses to vocalizations
given during social interactions. Many of these calls follow highly predictable
patterns. Female baboon threat-grunts, for example, are given only by higher-
ranking individuals to those lower-ranking in the dominance hierarchy, while
screams are given only by lower-ranking individuals to those of higher sta-
tus. By attending to such calls, monkeys can deduce not only the identities of
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direction, and its outcome.
For example, in an experiment designed to test baboons’ knowledge of other
individuals’ dominance ranks, subjects were played a sequence of calls that
mimicked a rank reversal among two unrelated females (Cheney et al. 1995b).
Call sequences consisted of a series of grunts combined with a series of fear
barks. As mentioned earlier, grunts are individually distinctive calls that func-
tion as signals of benign intent; they are given both by high-ranking females to
lower-ranking ones and vice versa. Fear barks, however, are unambiguous sig-
nals of subordination. They are always given by subordinate females to more
dominant ones, often when the more dominant is grunting and attempting to
interact with the subordinate’s infant.
Subjects were played a causally inconsistent call sequence in which a low-
ranking female apparently grunted to a high-ranking female and the high-
ranking female gave fear barks. As a control, subjects heard the same sequence
of grunts and fear barks made causally consistent by the inclusion of additional
grunts from a third female who was dominant to both of the others. Regardless
of their own relative ranks, subjects responded by looking toward the speaker
for signiﬁcantly longer durations to inconsistent sequences that violated the
female dominance hierarchy. They appeared to recognize not only the identi-
ties of different signalers but also the rank relations that existed among them
(Cheney et al. 1995a; Cheney and Seyfarth 2004).
Other playback experiments demonstrate that baboons can integrate their
knowledge of other individuals’ dominance ranks and kinship to recognize that
their social group is composed of a hierarchy of families (Bergman et al. 2003;
for evidence of baboons’ recognition of other individuals’ kinship relation-
ships, see Cheney and Seyfarth 1999). Female subjects were played sequences
of threat-grunts and screams that mimicked a ﬁght between two other females.
One sequence consisted of an anomalous threat-grunt-scream sequence mim-
icking a within-family rank reversal, for example B3 threat-grunts and B1
screams (in this notation, letters are used to denote matrilineal families, ranked
A, B, C, etc. from top to bottom and numbers are used to denote individuals
within these families). A second consisted of an anomalous sequence mim-
icking a between-family rank reversal (e.g., C1 threat-grunts + B3 screams).
The third consisted of a no-reversal control sequence consistent with the cur-
rent female dominance hierarchy (e.g., B3 threat-grunts and C1 screams, or B1
threat-grunts and B3 screams).
If baboons classify other individuals simultaneously according to both their
individual attributes (rank) and their membership in a higher-order class (ma-
trilineal kin group), they should have responded most strongly to the appar-
ent between-family rank reversal than to the within-family rank reversal. A
between-familyrankreversalispotentiallymuchmoresigniﬁcantthanawithin-
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relations of two entire matrilines rather than just two individuals within the
same family. This was indeed the case. In contrast, subjects responded rela-
tively weakly both to sequences that mimicked a within-family rank reversal
and to those in which no reversal took place (Bergman et al. 2003). Below we
consider the implication of these results for theories of language evolution.
3.6. Summary: The asymmetry between caller and recipient
In nonhuman primates – and perhaps many other animals – vocal production
and perception are strikingly different. Where call production is concerned,
primates have a comparatively small repertoire of vocalizations whose acous-
tic features are relatively innate. And while vocal production is not entirely
involuntary, most call types are tightly linked to a speciﬁc stimulus or context.
In contrast, primates and other animals exhibit an almost open-ended ability
to learn novel sound-meaning pairs. Learning can occur throughout adulthood
and is not linked to a particular social context. Moreover, the information ac-
quired from vocalizations is organized in highly structured ways and may be
both representational and propositional (see below).
The discontinuities betweenproduction andperception resultin anoddly un-
balancedform of communication: monkeys (andother animals)canlearnmany
sound-meaning pairs but cannot produce new words, and they understand con-
ceptual relations but cannot attach labels to them (Cheney and Seyfarth 1997b).
At the same time, it is crucial to remember that listeners are also signalers. The
baboon who artfully decodes an anomalous threat-grunt-scream sequence into
a rank reversal in the female dominance hierarchy will on some other occasion
be the individual who is screaming. It therefore seems unlikely that the men-
tal representations that underlie the interpretation and classiﬁcation of calls are
qualitatively different from those that accompany call production, or – more
often – those that remain private and unexpressed. The natural communication
of nonhuman primates argues strongly against the view that a concept cannot
be acquired unless it is instantiated in one’s language (reviewed by Gleitman
and Papafragou 2005). Monkeys and apes have many concepts for which they
have no words.
4. Pulling it all together
4.1. The crucial importance of a theory of mind
Why should an animal that can learn to associate hundreds of sounds and sym-
bols with objects and events ﬁnd it so difﬁcult to produce novel calls or create150 Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth
novel call combinations? To answer this question it may be useful to contrast
word learning in animals with word learning in very young children.
By the age of one year, children already seem to understand that words can
be mapped onto objects and actions in the world (reviewed by Fisher and Gleit-
man 2002; Bloom 2003). Crucially, this understanding seems to be accompa-
nied by a form of ‘social referencing’, in which the child uses other people’s di-
rection of gaze, gestures, and emotions to appraise a situation. Children at this
age also actively attend to the speaker’s gaze and focus of attention when infer-
ring the referent of the speaker’s utterance, as if they have developed some tacit
understanding that gaze and attention are a reﬂection of underlying knowledge
(Baldwin 1993). Similarly, around the age of one year children begin to use
gestures and sounds to recruit adults’ attention to external objects or events.
Through imitation, declarative gestures, and speech, they demonstrate their
view of adults as intentional beings. Children’s ability to compare another’s
perceptual state with their own forms the basis of a social referencing system
that is integral to early word learning (Bloom and Markson 1998; Tomasello
2003).
Although there are precursors to these abilities in the social interactions
and communication of monkeys and apes, they remain rudimentary (e.g., Ch-
eney and Seyfarth 1990; Anderson et al. 1996; Tomasello and Call 1997). Ba-
boons recognize when calls are being directed at themselves and they seem
to have some understanding of other individuals’ intentions (Cheney and Sey-
farth 1997a; Engh et al. in press). In contrast to the communication of even
very young children, however, monkey vocalizations appear designed to inﬂu-
ence other individual’s behavior, not their attention or knowledge. Although
monkeys vary their calling rates depending upon the presence and composition
of their audience, they do not act deliberately to inform ignorant individuals,
nor do they attempt to correct or rectify false beliefs in others or instruct others
in the correct usage or response to calls (Seyfarth and Cheney 1986).
The inability of monkeys and perhaps also apes to recognize many of the
mental mechanisms that underlie communication may also partially explain
the apparent absence of lexical syntax in their vocalizations. At least some of
the sounds produced by monkeys are functionally referential (Cheney and Sey-
farth 1990; Zuberbuhler 2003). Because they lack syntactic properties, how-
ever, their exact meaning is imprecise. A vervet monkey’s leopard alarm, for
example, cannot really be described as a command to action (“R u ni n t ot h e
trees”) because not all vervets run into trees upon hearing the call, and vervets
already in trees will also give this call if they spot a leopard. Nor is the call
simply a noun (“Leopard”o r“ Carnivore”), because it consistently evokes a
ﬂight response from at least some listeners. Instead, the vervet’s leopard alarm
call seems best described as a proposition: a single utterance or thought that
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Vervet alarm calls are thus simultaneously both eventish and objectish, be-
cause they incorporate both reference to an object and a disposition to behave
toward that object in a particular way. They refer to a particular sort of im-
mediate danger, and they function to designate particular classes of predators.
There is no evidence, though, that a leopard alarm call can be modiﬁed to elab-
orate upon the characteristics of the leopard in question. Through repetition
and changes in amplitude (both of which seem to carry prosodic information),
alarm calls may inform others of the immediacy of danger (e.g., Manser et al.
2001). They cannot, however, specify whether a leopard is big or small, sleep-
ing or stalking, in a tree or on the ground.
The lack of syntax in nonhuman primate vocalizations cannot be traced to
an inability to recognize argument structure – to understand that an event can
be described as a sequence in which an agent performs some action on an
object. Baboons clearly understand the difference between Hannah threatens
Sylvia and Sylvia threatens Hannah. It is also likely that nonhuman primates
can represent descriptive modiﬁers (a big leopard as opposed to a small one)
and prepositions that specify locations (a leopard in a tree as opposed to one
under the tree). Captive dolphins (Herman et al. 1993), sea lions (Schusterman
and Krieger 1986), and African grey parrots (Pepperberg 1992) can be taught
to understand and in some cases even produce modiﬁers. In their natural be-
havior, therefore, nonhuman primates certainly act as if they are capable of
thinking (as it were) in sentences. But even if monkeys mentally tag events as
argument structures (who does what to whom), they fail to map these tags onto
a communicative system in any stable or predictable way.
In sum, the communication of non-human animals lacks three features that
are abundantly present in the utterances of young children: a rudimentary abil-
ity to attribute mental states different from their own to others, the ability to
generate new words, and lexical syntax. We suggest that the absence of all
three features is not accidental, and that the lack of one (a theory of mind)
may explain the lack of the others (words and syntax). Because they cannot
attribute mental states like ignorance to one another and are unaware of the
causal relation between behavior and beliefs, monkeys and perhaps also apes
do not actively seek to explain or elaborate upon their thoughts. As a result,
they are largely incapable of inventing new words and of recognizing when
thoughts should be articulated. Because monkeys cannot distinguish between
what they know and what others know, they fail to recognize that ignorant indi-
viduals must have events explained to them. They do not understand the need
to specify whether a leopard is in at r e eo ron the ground, nor do they com-
ment about things in their absence (“the ﬂea bag that ate my mother”). Instead,
monkeys’ calls reﬂect the knowledge the signaler has rather than the knowl-
edge the signaler intends his audience to acquire (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990,
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Athoughtfulreadermayobjecttoatleastseveralpartsofthisproposal.What
do we mean by stating that a rudimentary theory of mind is essential to word
learning and production? After all, birds learn songs, but few would ascribe
song learning in birds to a theory of mind. Compared to birds, however, the
vocabularies of humans are more open-ended, more context-independent, and
more functionally eclectic. New sounds can be assigned to almost any object,
event, or descriptor. Equally important, the adoption of new words within the
community is rapid and reciprocal.
Crucially, even very young children appear to have some tacit recognition
of this relationship between comprehension and production. As a result, they
understand that they can use a newly acquired word to inﬂuence another’s be-
haviororattention.Similarcapacitieshaveyettobedemonstratedinthenatural
communication of any non-human primate.
4.2. Social intelligence as a precursor of language
Despite their lack of a theory of mind, nonhuman primates’ knowledge of so-
cial relationships and call meaning exhibits several striking properties.
First, knowledge is representational: when a monkey hears a vocalization
she acquires information that is very speciﬁc – about a particular sort of preda-
tor or a particular kind of interaction between speciﬁc individuals.
Second, social knowledge is based on properties that have discrete values:
for example, individual identity, sex, and dominance rank (Worden 1998).
Third, animals combine these discrete-valued traits to create a representa-
tion of social relations that is hierarchically structured: baboons, for example,
create a nested hierarchy in which others are placed in a linear rank order and
simultaneously grouped according to matrilineal kinship in a manner that pre-
serves ranks both within and across families.
Fourth, social knowledge is rule governed and open-ended: baboons rec-
ognize that vocalizations follow certain rules of directionality (for example,
screams are only given by subordinates to dominants), and that directionality
should conform to the existing dominance hierarchy. The hierarchy is open-
ended because new individuals can be added or eliminated without altering the
underlying structure, and because the set of all possible interactions is very
large (Worden 1998; Seyfarth and Cheney 2003a).
Fifth, knowledge is propositional: In tests mimicking between-family rank
reversals, listeners responded as if they parsed a call sequence as a dramatic
narrative: “Hannah is threatening Sylvia and Sylvia is screaming. But Sylvia
belongs to the alpha matriline and Hannah to the beta. This can only mean that
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Sixth, knowledge is independent of sensory modality: while playback ex-
periments allow us to explore the structure of primates’ social knowledge and
demonstrate that such knowledge can be acquired through vocalizations alone,
social knowledge is doubtless also obtained visually.
These properties of nonhuman primates’ social knowledge, while by no
means fully human, bear striking resemblances to the meanings we express
in language, which are – apparently spontaneously – built up by combining
discrete-valued entities in a structured, hierarchical, rule-governed, and open-
ended manner (Senghas et al. 2004). This leads to the hypothesis that the inter-
nal representations of language meaning in the human brain initially emerged
from our pre-linguistic ancestors’ knowledge of social relations (Cheney and
Seyfarth 1997b; Worden 1998). Social groups of monkeys are comprised of in-
tricate networks of relationships that are simultaneously competitive and coop-
erative, and in which alliances, friendships, and rivalries cut across both domi-
nance ranks and families. The demands of social life create selective pressures
for just the kind of complex, abstract conceptual abilities that are likely to have
preceded the earliest forms of linguistic communication. Indeed, as Worden
(1998) argues, “no other candidate meaning structure has such a good ﬁt to
language meanings.”
We are not suggesting that all of the syntactic properties found in language
are present in primate social knowledge. Syntax, in the sense most commonly
used by followers of Chomsky, remains a uniquely human trait. Instead, tak-
ing an evolutionary perspective, we suggest that the primate mind evolved in
an environment characterized by intense social competition, that such competi-
tion created selective pressures favoring structured, hierarchical, rule-governed
intelligence, and that such social intelligence shares many formal features with
linguistic intelligence. If we regard syntax as a succession of computations,
then the social knowledge of primates, including their ability to “decode” the
propositional information contained in a string of vocalizations, can be seen as
a precursor of the kinds of computations found in modern language.
The hypothesis that social cognition acted as a causal engine driving the evo-
lution of mental state attribution, vocabulary growth, and, ultimately, syntax
gains credence in part because the alternatives seem less likely. For example,
given what we know about the communication of monkeys and apes, it seems
unlikely that ﬂexible articulation, and hence the ability to generate new words,
would have preceded the conceptual capacity that would have made such ar-
ticulation adaptive. This argument is supported by research on word learning
in children which indicates that words are built upon pre-existing conceptual
representations (Hespos and Spelke 2004; Gleitman and Papafragou 2005).
Similarly, it is hard to imagine how the sorts of word learning and simple
syntax that we see in young children would have emerged without some rudi-
mentary ability to attribute attention and intent to others (Tomasello 2003). Just154 Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth
as the social knowledge of monkeys appears to incorporate some of the hierar-
chical, rule-governed features of human syntax, so does their communication
incorporate some rudimentary elements of young children’s intention-reading.
When responding to vocal signals, monkeys appear to attend simultaneously to
signaleridentity, the type ofcallgiven,the nature ofrecentinteractionswith the
signaler, and the target of her attention. We have argued that these inferences
may represent a ﬁrst crucial step toward the recognition of other individuals’
intentions and motives. The ability to make such inferences would seem to be
particularly adaptive in large social groups such as those found in many species
of monkeys, where it would be disadvantageous simply to react reﬂexively to
every vocalization that can be heard.
We began this essay by arguing that theories of language evolution cannot
focus exclusively on language – they require a broader perspective. To explain
the evolution of language, one must start not with its most complex, highly
evolved features but instead with the simpler properties of communication and
cognition that are shared by human and nonhuman primates, since it was these
features that set the stage for the emergence of modern language in all of its
complexity. We suggest that these features are: the ability of speakers to pro-
duce acoustically distinct, individually recognizable vocalizations in speciﬁc
contexts, the ability of listeners to assign meaning to such calls, and the ability
of individuals to organize meaning in ways that allow them to make deductions
about events in the world around them.
The existence of such features in the communication and cognition of con-
temporary nonhuman primates leads us to conclude that the earliest forms of
syntax did not emerge de novo but instead built upon pre-existing skills. Before
hominids produced syntactic utterances, they assigned meaning to other ani-
mals’ calls and extracted syntactic, rule-governed, propositional information
from them. Linguistic-like perception and cognition thus preceded linguistic
production.
In its very earliest stages, syntax was adaptive because even the simplest
rule-governed two-word utterances allowed individuals to inform, modify, ex-
plain, and elaborate in ways that were not possible with single words. The
earliest syntactic utterances, however, probably described relations that their
speakers already understood, and had a formal structure that grew out of their
speakers’ knowledge of social relations.
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